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Detection of Face Spoofing Using Visual Dynamics
Santosh Tirunagari, Norman Poh, David Windridge, Aamo Iorliam, Nik Suki, and Anthony T.S. Ho.
Abstract—Rendering a face recognition system robust is vital
in order to safeguard it against spoof attacks carried out by using
printed pictures of a victim (also known as print attack) or a
replayed video of the person (replay attack). A key property
in distinguishing a live, valid access from printed media or
replayed videos is by exploiting the information dynamics of
the video content, such as blinking eyes, moving lips, and facial
dynamics. We advance the state of the art in facial anti-spoofing
by applying a recently developed algorithm called Dynamic Mode
Decomposition (DMD) as a general-purpose, entirely data-driven
approach to capture the above liveness cues. We propose a
classification pipeline consisting of DMD, Local Binary Patterns
(LBP), and Support Vector Machines (SVM) with a histogram
intersection kernel. A unique property of DMD is its ability to
conveniently represent the temporal information of the entire
video as a single image with the same dimensions as those
images contained in the video. The pipeline of DMD+LBP+SVM
proves to be efficient, convenient to use, and effective. In fact
only the spatial configuration for LBP needs to be tuned. The
effectiveness of the methodology was demonstrated using three
publicly available databases: print-attack, replay-attack, and
CASIA-FASD, attaining comparable results with the state of the
art, following the respective published experimental protocols.
Index Terms—DMD, spoofing, replay-attack, print-attack,
CASIA-FASD, LBP, SVM.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope of study
The usage of biometrics in the area of security and for
authentication purposes is of well-established importance.
However, the widespread use of biometrics is hampered by
security concerns such as database tampering [1] and sensor
tampering (or presentation attack) [2], and many other attacks
described by Ratha et al. [3]. While database tampering
can lead to authorisation of an illegal individual, or denial
of service to a legitimate user, sensor tampering can cause
the granting of access right to an unauthorised user; thus,
severely compromising the security and usability of biometric
systems. In this paper, we are concerned with rendering a face
recognition system robust against presentation attacks; and
specifically, print attacks based on printed facial images, and
replay attack that is carried out by replaying a video sequence
using a tablet or a mobile phone.
The key innovation introduced here is the exploitation of
the facial dynamic information in a completely data-driven
fashion, rather than using prior knowledge regarding live face
images such as eye-blinking and lip-movements (e.g. [4]).
Since attack types are often unknown and very different
from each other. Knowledge-driven approaches are unlikely
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to be able to scale well to a plethora of attacks. Each new
attack potentially requires the algorithm designer to develop a
specific cue that is peculiar to the attack being employed. Data-
driven approaches, on the hand, can automatically learn to
discriminate valid (i.e. live) videos1 from attack videos given
a sufficiently wide range of training data and attack types.
In order to extract facial dynamic information reliably, we
propose a modified version of Dynamic Mode Decomposition
(DMD). Since DMD has been used extensively in modelling
fluid dynamics, we postulate that DMD can also capture the
complex dynamics of head movements, eye-blinking, and lip-
movements found in a typical video sequence containing face
images. However, DMD has not been used for classification
tasks before. For this reason, we propose a DMD-based
classification pipeline involving a texture-based descriptor,
coupled with a discriminative classifier. Our experiments show
that DMD can indeed capture unique features that clearly
distinguish videos produced by print and replay attacks from
live (valid) videos containing an authentic face.
B. Background on attacks directed at biometric systems
Attacks directed at biometric systems can be broadly clas-
sified as database tampering and sensor attacks:
Sensor tampering which is also referred to as a presentation
attack [6] is targeted towards fooling a biometric sensor. A
common type of presentation attack is spoofing, which refers
to the use of fake biometric data in order to deceive a biometric
system [2]. Spoofing attempts dealing with fake fingerprints
dates back to 1998, when Wills and Lees [7] indicated that
four out of six devices they tested were vulnerable to fake
prints attacks. Research has also been carried out on the
use of gum-based fingerprints to fool biometric systems by
Matsumoto et al. [8]. Thalheim et al. [9] further demonstrated
that fingerprints, iris scans and face recognition systems are
vulnerable to replay attacks.
For face recognition, there are two types of presentation
attacks, namely print attacks and replay attacks. A print attack
refers to facial spoofing carried out by presenting a printed
photo to a camera [10]. Indeed, this attack is very easy to
carry out because getting hold of a target’s photo is extremely
simple. With the increasing use of social media, few users
consider the repercussions associated with an act as simple
as uploading their pictures [10]. Replay attacks, on the other
hand, are carried out by replaying a previously recorded face
image (video) of a target user in order to spoof a biometric
system. The video can be replayed easily using a hand-held
mobile tablet. Again, with the widespread use of high-quality
1We refer to live, authentic videos as valid videos following closely Pinto’s
terminology [5]; as opposed to attack (or spoofed) videos produced by various
spoofing methods.
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consumer-grade camcorders and social media networks, this
type of attack can be carried out easily in both remote and
logical access control systems protected by a face recognition
system.
We exclude from this study replay attacks that require
an attacker to know about the architecture of a biometric
system. These attacks assume that the attacker can intercept
the communication channel between the biometric sensor and
its feature extractor, thus acquiring a raw biometric image; or
intercept the communication between the feature extractor and
the biometric matcher, thus acquiring an extracted biometric
feature set. It is further assumed that the attacker can replay or
reintroduce the copied data (raw image or biometric feature)
into the respective communication channel in order to gain
access to such a secured system [11]. These attacks are much
more sophisticated to carry out and are best counteracted by
securing the communication channels; therefore, they are out
of the scope of this study.
C. Motivation for DMD
There is a considerable challenge in extracting relevant sub-
components or modes from video data. Gaining a deep and
accurate understanding of complex flow behaviour requires
a form of reduced order models [12] or mode decomposi-
tion [13]. The mode decomposition of the form that we are
interested is commonly used in the area of computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) [14]. Specifically, Dynamic mode decompo-
sition (DMD), is a mathematical method developed to extract
the relevant modes from empirical data generated by non-
linear complex fluid flows. These modes provide a reduced-
order representation of the complex flow behaviour, called
coherent flow structures. The extraction of these coherent flow
structures is of great importance in CFD. In the context of face
counter-spoofing, we conjecture that DMD has the potential
of discovering the facial dynamics that captures the vitality
signs of valid face videos whilst extracting artefacts of spoof
videos such as moiring and planar effects, at the same time.
The moiring patterns are often regarded as undesired artefacts
of images, the effect of which is similar to fibers in moire silk.
The planar effect is the appearance of an picture that is flat
rather than 3D, as opposed to a real face.
DMD works analogously to Principle Component Analysis
(PCA). Whereas DMD contains dynamic information about
the data under consideration, PCA lacks this property [15].
Tirunagari et al. [16] compared PCA and DMD in extract-
ing Kelvin-Helmoltz instabilities from complex flows. They
showed that DMD is superior to PCA in analysing complex
fluid flows. This is consistent with the literature in both exper-
imental and numerical flow field data problems [15]. Indeed,
not only can DMD extract dynamic information effectively,
thus, temporal dynamic characteristics, it can also capture
spatially-coherent structures [15]. Schmidt et al.. [17] used
DMD on a sequence of fluid flow images and illustrated
how it can detect dynamically relevant coherent structures
for characterising fluid behaviour over a given time interval.
Schmid [15] introduced a DMD-variant by taking into consid-
eration an approximation of the linear mapping for temporal
‘snapshots’ and afterwards detects the relevant frequencies.
This method is, however, dependent on the snapshots acquired.
Problems addressed by DMD include: determining the flow
over a square cavity, calculating the wake structure behind a
flexible membrane, and determining the instabilities observed
in experiments of a jet passing between two cylinders [15].
Similarly, we conjecture that extracting relevant modes from
videos in face recognition can provide a good separability
between valid videos and the spoofed ones. Particularly, for
biometric applications such as replay and print attacks, in
which observations are carried out in a continuous pattern i.e.
several consecutive images in a video sequence rather than a
single snapshot of image extracted from a video, we propose
a modified DMD method that is computationally efficient for
handling large size videos. This constitutes the originality of
our proposal in tackling both photo and video based spoof
attacks.
Fig. 1. Four frames from a valid access, controlled scenario video clips
showing the eye-blinking and the lip movements. The bottom row shows
their corresponding first dynamic mode image.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of DMD in Figure 1. The
images in the top two rows show the corresponding extracted
frames from each of the two videos containing a valid-access
request in a controlled scenario. Since the person in these
videos was speaking and blinking his eyes inevitably from
time to time, one can observe that the corresponding first
DMD mode highlights dynamic changes in the lip movements
and eyes blinks. However, eye blinking is less obvious for
the second video. It is, therefore, necessary to experimentally
validate the effectiveness of DMD for this problem.
D. Contributions
Although much work has been directed towards tackling
issues related to print attacks and replay attacks, as well as
the development of publicly available databases, e.g., the print-
attack database [18], the replay-attack database [19] and the
CASIA-FASD database [20], there is still significant room for
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improvement for anti-spoofing methods in face recognition.
In particular, there is no literature on the use of DMD on
print and replay attacks. Our first contribution is, therefore, to
introduce the use of DMD for countering spoof attacks in face
recognition. Since DMD has not been used with classification
of video sequences, we propose a system pipeline consisting
of DMD, LBP and SVM. This combination is ideal because
DMD captures the visual dynamics in the form of a fixed-size
image, LBP can effectively capture the dynamic patterns, and
SVM is known to be an ideal general-purpose classifier that
minimizes the empirical risk of classification error. Extensive
experiments were conducted on: (i) a print-attack dataset [18]
containing 200 videos of real-access and 200 videos of spoof
attempts using printed photographs of 50 different identities.
(ii) Replay-attack dataset containing 200 videos of valid-access
and 1000 videos of spoof attempts using printed photographs,
tablets replays and mobile phones replays of 50 different
identities. (iii) The CASIA-FASD containing 50 real clients
with 150 valid-access videos and 450 attack videos.
Our second contribution is related to making the DMD more
practical. First we implemented a version of DMD that is
faster. While the original DMD uses QR-decomposition [21]
(decomposition of a matrix in to an orthogonal matrix Q
and an upper triangular matrix R) and singular value de-
composition (SVD) methods [22], we propose to use LU
decomposition [23] (factors a matrix as the product of a lower
triangular matrix L and an upper triangular matrix U). Second,
in our modified DMD, we use the absolute value of the
complex modes when rendering the “DMD image”. Third, we
recommend that the optimal mode to select the DMD modes
using the zero phase angle criteria. In short, we have made
DMD practical for classification and have demonstrated its
effectiveness on separating valid access videos from spoofed
ones.
Our final contribution is to simplify the taxonomy of ex-
isting facial anti-spoofing methods by categorising them as
being data-driven or cue-based. For each category, a number of
methods are further enumerated (see Figure 2) and supported
by the relevant literature as shown in Table I. In this way,
the strengths of different solutions proposed in the literature
can be taken full advantage in order to improve the liveness
detection task of the 2D face recognition technology.
E. Organisation
Section II, presents state-of-the-art methods using our pro-
posed categorisation. Section III, presents the modified version
of Dynamic Mode Decomposition (DMD) method and its ap-
plication on spoof detection. A brief overview of the selected
face spoofing datasets is presented in Section IV. Section V
presents the experimental procedure including the results,
followed by conclusions and future directions in Section VI.
II. EXISTING SOLUTIONS
According to Chakka et al. [24], techniques to counter
spoofing in 2-D face recognition systems are generally divided
into motion, liveness, and texture analyses. Motion generally
refers to motion features such as optical flow, e.g., [4] and [25].
Liveness analysis refers to the detection of the vitality signs of
a biometric sample, such as head and lips movement, and eye-
blinking. Finally, texture analysis refers to the use of texture
descriptors for discriminating valid videos from the spoofed
ones.
We argue that such a categorisation is ambiguous and does
not help one to identify the strength of each technique. For
example, a liveness analysis method that relies on movements
is often implemented using motion descriptors such as optical
flow. As a result, it is futile to argue whether or not a method is
classified as belonging to liveness analysis or motion analysis.
Instead, we advocate to “decompose” existing methods into
primary components in such a way that the strengths of
different solutions proposed in the literature can be taken
full advantage for improving the liveness detection task of
the 2D face recognition technology. Our proposed broad
categorisation of methods classifies a method as either data-
driven or cue-based. This categorisation and some of the
potential subcategories and specific methods are shown in
Figure 2. While cue-based methods rely on intuitions and/or
observations, data-driven methods tend to use generic image-
processing algorithms that are applicable to a wide range of
computer vision tasks. It is worth noting that the cue-based
Fig. 2. Categorisation of specific methodologies existing in the literature.
and data-driven attributes are not mutually exclusive. Indeed,
a cue-based method may rely on generic texture descriptors
such as local binary pattern (LBP) or motion descriptors
such as optical flow. As a result, categorising a method as
being texture-only or motion-only would not help a deeper
understanding of which component of the method works, why
it works, what assumption is made, and when it may fail.
By decomposing a method based on cue-based attributes and
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data-driven attributes, the success or failure of a technique can
be clearly identified. The result of this analysis is shown in
Table I.
A. Cue-based methods
We further distinguish two types of cues, namely liveness
cues and attack-specific properties/cues.
Liveness cues. We define liveness cues as ones that depend
on the vitality signs of a biometric trait. For 2D face recogni-
tion, these cues are eye blinking, lips movement, and changes
in facial expression. These cues were either made implicit or
explicit by authors such as Tronci et al. [30], Li et al. [1], Tan
et al. [27], Peixoto et al. [28], Pan et al. [33], and potentially
many other authors. While this approach may be effective for
countering attacks based on printed face images, it may fail
completely with a video-based replay attack because a video
can capture all aspects of facial liveness stated above. Given
the ease of acquiring facial video and the high accessibility of
facial videos in the public domain such as Facebook, often
posted by the user himself, the possibility of an attacker
employing a video-based replay attack is extremely high. In
order to address this weakness, one will need to look for
additional attack-specific cues that are described below.
Attack-specific cues are those that do not rely on the facial
properties and are often idiosyncratic to attack method. An
example of this is the moiring effect which is a secondary
and visually undesirable artefacts that are caused by two
superimposed patterns. In the context of 2D face attack, this
effect is caused by the recapture of an image from another
display device. This effect was pointed out in Pinto et al.’s
work [5]. Interestingly, the non-face information such as the
moiring effect can be obtained from the facial region but this
is still considered an attack-specific cue. Another cue that is
peculiar to a planar media such as a printed face image or
a face image shown on a digital tablet is the flatness of the
replicated image. The first use of this cue is attributed to Bao et
al. [32].
Generality of cue-based methods. Because cue-based
methods exploit the peculiarity of a specific attack setting
or method, the solution may not always generalized to other
attack methods. As a result, one may obtain poorer results than
those reported in the initial studies. Indeed, some literature [5]
suggests that cue-based methods that aim to exploit printed
medium attacks may not work on replay video-based attacks
or 3D mask attacks. For instance, Li’s method [1] which is
based on facial size difference and invariant facial pose and
expression may not work when the assumptions do not hold.
One way to invalidate the assumptions thus defeating the
countermeasure is by rotating or bending a printed face photo
with high very resolution, as suggested by Pinto et al. [5].
Another example is Pan’s method [33] which is based on the
cue that the face region and the region outside the face (that
is, the scene context), are different. Since the background of
an image may be different from one live video to another, the
method may fail. Furthermore, with a 3D mask, an attacker
can also simulate eye blinking by looking through a perforated
3D mask. Indeed, in an attempt to replicate Bao’s method [32]
and Kollreider’s method [25], Anjos et al. [35] found that these
methods did not work well for video-based replay methods
even after tuning the parameters associated with the algorithms
as optimally as possible on their database following a strictly
well-defined and unbiased experimental protocol.
B. Data-driven methods
Data-driven methods can be further divided into motion and
texture analyses. By motion analyses, we understand that the
method exploits consecutive images in a sequence such as
optical flow, or considering a video as a multidimensional
sequence or time-series. In contrast, a method is considered
texture analysis if it can derive information from a single
image frame in the video.
For motion analysis, one can further divide them into two
subcategories, using one of the following strategies:
1) Consecutive-frame analysis: analysing motion on two
consecutive video frames, such as methods based on optical
flow.
2) Video-as-an-image-sequence analysis: analysing mo-
tion by treating a video as a multidimensional sequence.
Under this categorisation, Bao’s method [32], Kollreider’s
method [25] and Anjos’s method [35] that are based on op-
tical flow are considered consecutive-frames analysis methods.
Similarly, our method based on DMD also belongs to this
category. However, DMD does so by taking into account of
all possible consecutive pairs of images in a video sequence
in its formulation (to be discussed in Section III-A). In this
sense, video-as-an-image-sequence analysis is a generalisation
of consecutive-frame analysis.
Video-as-an-image-set analysis. Another possible case that
was not covered above is analysing a video by treating it
as a collection or set of images. Such an approach typically
does not consider the motion information. An example of this
approach is to project a set of images into a texture subspace
using principal component analysis (PCA). Since the ordering
of the image does not matter, the motion information is not
exploited.
Unlike PCA, DMD treats a video as a sequence of images
and projects them in the principal motion subspaces. As a
result, DMD is superior to PCA in classifying motion. Indeed,
a large body of literature in fluid dynamics have demonstrated
the superiority of DMD over PCA. For this reason, we
conjecture that DMD is a viable candidate for classifying facial
video liveness.
Video-as-a-set texture analysis. An extension of texture
analysis is to apply a method to the entire set of video images.
This leads to a variant of texture analysis that we refer to as
video-as-a-set texture analysis. This type of analysis can be
done at the feature-level or at the score level. In the first case,
new features are derived by combining the features extracted
from each image in a video sequence or a batch or chunk of
video sequence. The derived features can be combined until an
entire video is processed. LBP-TOP is one such example [36].
At the score level, typically the output of a liveness classifier
which reflects a hypothesis score is used in the combination
process. The classifier first classifies each image in a video
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TABLE I
CATEGORISATION OF EXISTING FACIAL COUNTER-SPOOFING METHODS.
Broad category Data-driven Cue-based (motivated
by)
Narrow category Motion analysis Texture analysis Liveness cues Attack-
specific
proper-
ties
Consecutive-
frame analysis
Video analysis Frequency or spatial anal-
ysis
E.g. blinking eyes, lips
movement
E.g.
planar
effect,
moiring
effect
Li’s method [26] 2D Fourier spectrum Photo attack has a smaller
face size; and the facial
expression and pose are
invariant
Tan’s method [27] Variational retinex-
based and difference-of-
Gaussian (DoG)
The surface roughness in
terms of Lambertian re-
flectance between valid
and spoof videos are dif-
ferent
Peixoto’s method [28] Applying an adaptive his-
togram equalisation to the
images before extracting
latent reflectance features
The brightness of the LCD
screen affects the recap-
tured image, which makes
the image edges more sus-
ceptible to blurring
Maatta’s method [29] Micro-texture analysis via
LBP with SVM as a clas-
sifier
Tronci’s static method [30] Texture histogram captur-
ing colour in RGB and
HSV space; edge directiv-
ity; MPEG descriptors
The loss of information
through the image recap-
turing process and the pe-
culiar noise
Tronci’s video-based method [30] eye blinks, mouth alter-
ations and changes in fa-
cial expression
Schwartz’s method [31] shape, colour and texture
of the face
Bao’s method [32] Optical flow Comparing a half of face
with another half that is
divided in two ways: hor-
izontally and vertically.
Planar object movement
cues aiming to detect four
basic rigid object motion
types, namely, translation,
in-plane rotation, panning
or out-of-plane rotation
(swing)
Kollreider’s method [4] and [25] Optical flow Capturing the subtle
movements of different
facial parts (i.e., face and
ear proportion), assuming
that facial parts on real
faces move differently
than on photos.
Pan’s method [33] and [34] Optical flow Inside face changes (e.g.,
eye blinking) versus out-
side face (the scene con-
text)
Pinto’s visual rhythm [5] Multiple video spectra
represented by gray-
level co-occurrence
matrices represented by
12 statistical descriptors
Frequency analysis of
noise residuals
Noise
residuals
capture
moiring
effect
Anjos’s method [35] Optical flow-
derived statistics
based on Chi-
square distance
of a pair of
Von-mises
distributions
Inside face versus outside
face context
Our proposed method Matrix decompo-
sition of consec-
utive pairs of de-
tected face im-
ages
Dynamic mode decompo-
sition
LBP features classified by
SVM
Although not based on
cues, DMD can detect eye
movements, lips move-
ment, and the facial dy-
namics.
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sequence and the resultant scores, one from each image, are
combined via a fixed operator such as mean or a second-level
classifier that combines the statistics (e.g. [37]).
C. Key considerations in 2D facial counter-spoofing
The growing body of literature in 2D facial counter-spoofing
have implicit addressed two key issues, namely:
• The importance of motion information.
• The need for a classifier to discriminate between valid
and spoof facial videos.
Motion-based methods versus non-motion-based meth-
ods. Through a number of comparative studies, such as those
reported by Anjos et al. [35], Chakka et al. [24], Chingovska
et al.’s works [19], there is sufficient evidence to suggest
that motion information is vital and methods based on this
information can cover a wide range of attacks targeting the 2D
face recognition technology. Indeed, motion can capture not
only liveness cues but also attack-specific cues as discussed
above. Later we will compare both types of approaches in
our experiments, i.e., PCA, which represents a nonmotion-
based method versus DMD, which represents a motion-based
method.
Trainable versus non-trainable methods. Another impor-
tant consideration among all the methods surveyed here is
whether or not a method is trainable. All data-driven methods
are considered trainable by definition because each of these
methods requires a classifier to be able to discriminate valid
videos from the spoofed ones. Although these methods can
potentially be more general and more robust, they can only
work well with spoofing methods that are found in the training
set. If an attack type is not present in the training set, it
is possible that the classifier may not generalise well. In
comparison, cue-based methods may not require a classifier;
therefore, they are considered non-trainable. An example of
this is Anjos’s optical flow correlation algorithm (in [35])
which does not need a trainable classifier but nevertheless
requires a few parameters to be tuned via cross-validation on
a given data set.
In summary, although the generalisation ability of a method
to an unseen attack type is not guaranteed, trainable meth-
ods have the additional advantage that given a sufficiently
representative training data that contains a plethora of attack
methods, they are a preferred solution because they can
exploit the additional data without significantly modifying the
underlying algorithm unlike the cue-based methods. For this
reason we consider a trainable methodology based on DMD.
D. Characteristics of DMD and its comparison with existing
methods
1) Characteristics of DMD: Among the methods surveyed,
few methods are completely data-driven and do not rely on any
cues. For example, Pinto’s method [5] is considered a cue-
based method and data-driven because it exploits the moiring
effect, the derived features of which are then classified using
SVM. DMD is a method that qualifies both criteria. Indeed,
DMD is an algorithm that exploits the motion information in
a video sequence. Although optical flow can also capture this
information for a pair of consecutive frames, DMD does so at
the sequence level.
Although completely data-driven, we find that DMD can
capture liveness cues and attack-specific artefacts at the same
time. For instance, DMD can capture eye-blinking and lips
movements, as well as the peculiarity of attacks. Furthermore,
DMD can also capture the motion due to attack-specific
artefacts such as planar movement. This is shown in Figure 6.
2) Competing methods: As explained, DMD is somewhat
unique in its category of algorithms because of its ability to
process multidimensional temporal sequence, which is a gen-
eralisation of consecutive-frames analysis such as algorithms
based optical flow. Among them, we have chosen Anjos’s
method [35] which is considered superior among all the optical
flow methods. We have also chosen Pinto’s method [5] because
of its use of a classifier. Table II compares the DMD with these
two algorithms in terms of a number of attributes.
Pinto’s visual rhythm works well only if the assumption
about the high frequency image component, that is, the noise
artefacts introduced by the recaptured printed/planar medium
behave in the same way. Unfortunately, the video replay attack
carried out by Pinto was based on LCD screen for replaying
the video with a mounted (Sony Cybershot) camera. Therefore,
no random movement that is typically produced by hand-held
attack media is observed in the test set. It is, therefore, not
clear how this movement might affect Pinto’s algorithm.
Similarly, Anjos’s optical flow correlation works well under
the assumption that face and non-face regions have different
distribution properties in terms of optical flow. Presumably
a talking face video sequence would induce large chi-square
distances. Anjos’s method also implicitly relies on involun-
tary eye-blinking motions which happen every 3-4 seconds.
However, a valid, face video without movement that happens
between two eye-blinking motions would induce much smaller
chi-square distances just as a printed facial photo attack does,
leading to potential false rejection. A strength of their method
is that they can use a standard face detector without explicitly
needing to localise the two eyes in an image.
In comparison, the proposed DMD is completely data-
driven; yet it is able to detect liveness cues and attack-
specific artefacts, as described above. However, DMD needs
a classifier. For this reason, we propose to use DMD in
conjunction with LBP as a texture descriptor of the visual
dynamics, and SVM as a back-end classification engine. This
proposed DMD-pipeline was tested on both printed-medium
attacks and replayed video attacks across various settings,
including hand-held and mounted reply media, using the latest
print-attack and replay-attack face datasets. Our experimental
results, following strictly the published experimental protocols,
show that the proposed DMD pipeline achieved the best
performance reported so far (with the exception of komu-
lainen’s method [38] on CASIA-FASD dataset, to be further
discussed in Section V-H) in comparison to the literature,
i.e., Chingovska et al.’s work [19]. Indeed, the classification
performance was perfect for the printed media and for the
video-replay attacks, we achieved an HTER of 0.55% on the
development set and 0% on the test set.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE DMD WITH PINTO’S VISUAL RHYTHM AND ANJOS’ METHOD IN TERMS OF A NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTES.
Attributes DMD pipeline (our proposal) Pinto’s visual rhythm [5] Anjos’ method [35]
Consider multiple frames? Video-as-an-image-sequence Video-as-a-set Video-as-an-image-sequence
(see text)
Observational feature Spatial domain (pixel) Frequency domain of noise resid-
ual
Optical flow
Does observation capture
motion?
Yes, for the entire sequence Yes, via optical flow and their sub-
sequent concatenated images (vi-
sual rhythm)
Yes, via optical flow
Features used for classifi-
cation
LBP applied to DMD principal
modes
12 statistical features derived from
the gray-level co-occurrence matri-
ces of the concatenated image-set
spectra
A pair of Von-mises distributions
derived from the facial region and
non-face region of the optical flow
output
Classifier SVM SVM, Partial Least Square Chi-square distance
Cues relied upon or ex-
tracted
Automatically detect liveness cues
and attack-specific artefacts
Authors’ intuition on the moiring
effect of the replay video
Authors’ intuition that face versus
nonface optical flow are different
III. METHODOLOGY
Fig. 3. Flow chart showing the steps involved in the methodological pipeline.
In this section, we present the pipeline of our method which
consists of DMD, Local Binary Pattern histograms and a
kernel based Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier. The
overall methodology or process pipeline is shown in Figure 3.
First, a video is processed using the DMD algorithm in order
to output dynamic mode images. From which, we select
a single dynamic mode image corresponding to eigenvalue
whose phase angle is = 0 or closest to it. Second, LBP
histogram features are computed for this dynamic mode image.
Finally, the produced LBP code is fed into a trained SVM
classifier in order to classify whether the processed video is a
valid access or spoof. Half Total Error Rate (HTER) is used
to evaluate the performance measure. To validate our DMD
pipeline we have used principle component analysis (PCA)
based on snapshot approach as a baseline method.
A. Dynamic Mode Decomposition (DMD)
Let pr be the rth video frame whose size is m × n. This
video frame pr is converted to mn×1 column vector, resulting
in the construction of a data matrix P of size mn×N for N
video frames.
P = [p1, p2, p3, · · · , pN ] =
 p
1
1 p
1
2 ... p
1
N
...
...
...
...
pmn1 p
mn
2 ... p
mn
N
 . (1)
A linear mapping A from one video frame to an another in
the sequence is assumed as these frames are correlated.
P = [p1, Ap1, A2p1, A3p1, · · · , AN−1p1].
[p2, p3, · · · , pN ] = A[p1, p2, · · · , pN−1].
P2 = AP1.
(2)
The system A is unknown and it captures the overall visual
dynamics within the video. Computing eigen solution for A
is computationally expensive since, A is large(mn × mn).
For this reason, methods based on Krylov subspaces [39],
[40], [41] could be efficiently used. The columns in the
Krylov subspace are non-orthogonal but orthogonality could
be achieved using Arnoldi iteration.
Equation 2 formulates the video frames in the span of krylov
sequences. As a starting point of the Arnoldi algorithm, we
have.
AP1 ≈ P1H. (3)
Here, H a companion matrix is introduced that simply shifts
from frames 1 through N −1 and approximates the last frame
N by linearly combining the previous N−1 frames, i.e., P2 =
c0p1 + ...+ cNpN−1 = {p1, p2, p3, · · · , pN−1}c.
H =

0 0 . . . 0 −c0
1 0 . . . 0 −c1
. . . . . .
...
...
1 0 −cN−2
1 −cN−1
 . (4)
In matrix form, we then have:
P2 ≈ P1H. (5)
From Equations 3 and 5, we have
AP1 ≈ P2 ≈ P1H. (6)
Hence this procedure will result in the low dimensional
system matrix H . We solve the H matrix problem using
eigenvalue analysis and obtain eigenvalues and vectors. It
is known that eigenvalues of H approximate some of the
eigenvalues of the full system A. The associated eigenvectors
of H provide the coefficients for the linear combination that
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is necessary to express the visual dynamics within the video
frame basis. H is calculated as follows:
H = U−1L+P2. (7)
Here, L+ is the pseudo inverse of L from the LU-
decomposition of P1 subspace (refer to the DMD processing
steps in Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Dynamic Mode Decomposition
Input: Sequence of images in a video P =
[p1, p2, p3, · · · , pN ]
Output: Dynamic mode DM corresponding to the phase
angle = 0
1: P1 ← [p1, p2, p3, · · · , pN−1]
2: P2 ← [p2, p3, p4, · · · , pN ]
3: [L U ]← lu(P1)
4: H ← (U−1L+P2)
5: [Evec Eval]← eig(H)
6: λj ← sort(angle(Evaljj)) # sort Evec correspondingly
7: DM ← abs(P1 × Evec) # project P1 on the eigenvectors of H
8: DMD mode select ← (DM(:, k)) # K is the index of the eigenvector,
whose corresponding eigenvalue’s phase angle is equals to or closest to 0
Dynamic modes not only contain the information about
dynamic structures, but also about the temporal evolution of
patterns within a video sequence. Since at no stage of the
algorithm the system matrix A is needed, various extensions
of the algorithm are possible. No specific spatial arrangement
of the image data is assumed and there are no parameters to
be tuned. The first dynamic mode captures the largest scale
dynamics that is present in the sequence of frames [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17].
B. Principle Component Analysis (PCA) via snapshot ap-
proach
In order to compare DMD, this section explains how
PCA can be calculated, and the output of which can be
directly used to replace the DMD output. Therefore, we in
here use a variant of PCA that is based on the ‘snapshots’
approach which is introduced by Sirovich [43]. Here each
video frame at a particular interval in time is considered to
be one snapshot. This method was introduced to reduce the
computations of covariance matrices. Normally, computing
PCA requires solving a mn×mn eigenvalue problem, where
mn is the total number of pixels in a video frame. The
snapshots method proposes that the covariance matrix can
be approximated by a linear combination of the ‘snapshots’.
Instead of computing mn×mn covariance matrix, this method
computes a covariance matrix of size N×N . This method has
become extremely popular in the field of CFD [44], [45], [46].
To implement the snapshots method, a sequence of images
is converted to form a matrix as shown in Equation 1
The fluctuating pixel intensity matrix U is calculated by
subtracting the mean matrix (average pixel intensities) Pˆ from
P,
U = P− Pˆ. (8)
The covariance matrix is computed as
C = UTU. (9)
An eigenvalue problem for the covariance matrix is then solved
CAi = λiAi. (10)
The eigenvectors are arranged according to the decreasing
order of eigenvalues. This ordering is physically meaningful
because, it reflects the fluctuating intensity energies in the PCA
modes. Using the ordered eigenvectors the PCA modes are
constructed.
φi =
∑N
n=1A
i
nU
n
‖∑Nn=1AinUn‖ , i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (11)
In our experiments, we consider only the first PCA mode
as this mode captures the greatest percentage of the intensity
fluctuation from the video frames [16], [45], [47], [44].
C. Local Binary Patterns (LBP)
Local Binary Patterns (LBP), a powerful image represen-
tation, extracts texture information that is invariant to local
gray-scale variations. During the LBP operation, every image
pixel acts as a threshold to its neighbours to obtain a binary bit
string which then forms a round number. In real applications,
an image is usually divided into several small non-overlapping
blocks of the same size to keep the spatial relation of objects.
Conventionally, LBP is denoted as B-LBPu2P,R, where P and R
denote the neighbourhood pixels and radius respectively and
the superscript u2 denotes uniform LBP. B denotes the number
of non-overlapping blocks. In this study we consider P = 8
for block-size = {1×1, 3×3, 5×5} and radii = {1, 2, 3}. The
optimal LBP settings are determined by cross validation.
D. SVM classifier - Histogram Intersection Kernel
Kernel based Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a widely
used pattern classification method and is well known for its
high classification accuracy. Kernel methods transform data
from a low dimensional space to a high dimensional space
using non-linear maps. By non-linearly mapping the data onto
the high dimensional space, it is theoretically shown that any
linearly non-separable data can become linearly separable [48],
[49]. Since only the inner product between a pair of obser-
vations is required in the SVM formulation, the non-linear
mapping does not need to be explicitly defined for an indi-
vidual observation in the training set. Instead, the non-linear
kernel function is also defined for a pair of observations. This
maintains the efficiency of the SVM. Therefore, a kernel based
SVM in general has a better performance over an original
SVM for linearly non-separable classification tasks [50].
In this study we opted to use the Histogram Intersection
Kernel [51], which is also known as the Min Kernel because
it has been shown to be efficient and effective in image
classification tasks [52]. The kernel is defined as follows:
K(x, y) =
n∑
i=1
min(xi, yi), (12)
where n is the number of dimensions in the LBP histogram
and x and y are the LBP histograms. Note that this kernel has
no additional parameter to tune, which is convenient to use.
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E. Performance and Threshold Criteria
Although the output of SVM can be used to make a hard
decision, we shall use its soft output, which is defined as the
distance of a test sample from the SVM decision hyperplane.
For all experiments, we label samples derived from valid
videos as positive; and those derived from attack videos to
be negative.
Let T be the domain of SVM output. The decision is
made by comparing the SVM output t ∈ T with a decision
threshold, ∆ ∈ T , as follows:
decision(t) =
{
valid access if t > ∆
spoof/attack otherwise, (13)
In order to calculate errors, we introduce match and non-
match score sets, Y1 ⊂ Y and Y0 ⊂ Y , respectively. This
can result in two errors, namely, false rejection and false
acceptance, the rates of which are calculated as follows:
FRR(∆) ≡ P (t < ∆|ω1) (14)
≈ |y|y ∈ Y1, y < ∆||Y1| (15)
FAR(∆) ≡ 1− P (t < ∆|ω0), (16)
≈ |y|y ∈ Y1, y < ∆||Y1| (17)
respectively, where the conditioning variable ω1 indicates that
the comparison is due to a positive class (valid access) whereas
ω0 indicates that the comparison is due to a negative class
(spoof/attack). The average of these both errors is defined by
HTER.
HTER(∆) =
1
2
(FAR(∆) + FRR(∆))
By taking the geometric average of FAR and FRR, HTER
has the advantage that it is not affected by the overwhelmingly
large sample size of one class versus another because both
types of errors are weighted equally, thus coercing equal con-
tribution of both errors, i.e., assuming equal prior probability
for both classes. In our case, this is particularly desirable
because the prior probability of an attack is difficult to estimate
in practice. In the absence of any additional information, using
equal prior probabilities is a reasonable option.
In order to report unbiased performance, the decision thresh-
old that attains the optimal performance on a development set,
i.e., ∆∗ is then applied to the test set.
IV. DATASETS
In this section we discuss the datasets used in our study.
We have chosen to use datasets containing print attack and
replay attack spoof samples. These datasets consist of short
video recordings for both valid-access and attack attempts.
A. Print-attack Dataset
Print-attack Dataset [35] is the first publicly available
dataset that provides a precise protocol with training, develop-
ment and test sets. It contains a short video of valid access and
spoof attacks to 50 different identities. The spoof attack that
is emphasised in this dataset is print attack only, whereby an
impostor presents a printed photograph of the targeted identity
in order to falsify the access to a face biometric authentica-
tion system. This dataset, includes two different scenarios:
(i) controlled background (the background is uniform) and
(ii) adverse background (a non-uniform background). These
scenarios provide a valid simulation of the attack environment.
B. Replay-attack Dataset
To extend the print-attack dataset, Chingovska et al. [19]
introduced a replay-attack dataset with more sophisticated
attacks. To validate the attacks, the author categorised the
attacks in three different scenarios:
• Print attack: printed photograph (same protocols as pro-
posed in print-attack).
• Mobile attack: the impostor presents photos and videos
taken with a mobile phone using the mobile screen.
• Tablet attack: the impostor presents a high resolution
digital photos and videos using an iPad screen.
The replay-attack dataset consists of 200 videos of valid
access (with 375 frames each), and 1000 videos of attack
attempts (with 240 frames each). The dataset is divided into
three partitions, namely development, training and testing set.
The development set is used for estimating the threshold value
and training set is used for estimating any model parameters.
Each of these sets are generated by a video gallery of 15
clients for development and training, and 20 clients for testing.
This means that the training and testing sets are disjoint and
completely independent of each other.
C. CASIA-FASD dataset
Additionally, to validate our proposed pipeline, we consider
the CASIA-FASD spoofing dataset [20], which is more chal-
lenging than the first two data sets. For instance, it contains
printed 2D attack with perforated eyes in order to simulate eye
blinking, known as a ’cut-photo’ attack. This data set contains
print attacks (or warped photo), cut-photo attacks and reply
attacks captured in three settings, namely low, normal, and
high resolutions. In total, the dataset consists of 600 videos
including 150 valid-access and 450 attacks. The training and
testing sets include 240 and 360 videos respectively.
V. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
In this section we discuss the experimental procedures as
well as the results. The objectives of our experiments are as
follows:
1) Qualitative assessment of dynamic information cap-
tured by DMD. From the outset, we conjecture that
DMD can capture liveness cues such as eye blinks, lips
movements and facial dynamics. Therefore, for valid
videos, we wish to examine whether these features are
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indeed picked up by DMD. In the case of photo attacks,
DMD modes should, in theory, be characterised by a
lack of motion, resulting in a somewhat noisy image.
Finally, we expect that the facial texture properties of
valid accesses and video attacks would differ due to the
replayed videos being affected by the moiring or planar
effects. Since DMD captures spatial-temporal features,
it is reasonable to expect that the DMD modes would
produce somewhat different textures.
2) Optimisation of the DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline. In
our proposed DMD classification pipeline, there are two
parameters that need to be pre-determined, namely, (1)
the choice of DMD mode, and (2) parameters associated
with the LBP parameters.
Optimal DMD mode: In theory, for a video with N
frames, we obtain N − 1 DMD modes. Recall that each
dynamic mode captures a “principal dynamics” axes of
the video sequence. In order to select the most optimal
mode, we choose the eigenvector whose corresponding
eigenvalue has a phase angle that is equal to or closest to
0. Although it is possible to use all the dynamic modes,
we limit our choice to a single mode because in our
preliminary experiments, this configuration produced
already very satisfactory classification performance.
Optimal LBP parameters: For the LBP, we have to
determine the optimal block size from the configurations
{1×1, 3×3, 5×5} and the radius from {1, 2, 3} pixels
(in the DMD domain). The optimal block size and radius
are determined experimentally.
For the SVM, the histogram intersection kernel does
not have any parameter to tune; and we shall use the
standard SVM parameters without modification.
3) Comparison of DMD with the state-of-the-art meth-
ods. Once the optimal parameters have been determined
on the development set, following the published Print
Attack and Replay Attack protocols, the DMD-LBP-
SVM pipeline is then applied to the evaluation (test)
set. The interest in this experiment is to benchmark the
generalisation performance of DMD against the state-
of-the-art methods.
4) Effect of window size on the system performance. It
is of interest to find out the impact of video window
size on the generalisation performance. For this reason,
we consider the window sets of top X×10-frames from
the video sequence, where X ranges from 1, 2 . . . , 240
(240 is the maximum number of available frames on the
Print and Replay Attack databases). We conjecture that
performance of DMD should improve with an increasing
size of images available within a video.
5) Additional research questions. In the subsequent ex-
periments, we shall also address three issues related to
the peculiarities of the database and the DMD classifi-
cation pipeline.
a) The impact of the face cropping on original
images. We note that in the replay-attack dataset,
the faces in the attack videos are larger in com-
parison to the faces found in the valid videos. In
order to investigate if the face size might influence
the classification results, we consider only the face
regions – as defined by the output of a face detector
– with a background window of proportional size.
b) Pipeline with and without LBP features. This
experiment is designed to assess how much contri-
bution is brought by LBP in the DMD+LBP+SVM
pipeline. In theory, if LBP can successfully capture
the video dynamics, one could simply do without
DMD. In order to create this pipeline (without
LBP), we directly use the histogram intensity of
the chosen DMD mode – referred to as “DMD
features” – and use the SVM with histogram inter-
section kernel as before. This results in a simplified
pipeline labelled as DMD+SVM.
c) Comparison with PCA as a baseline method.
From the outset, supported by the literature in
computation fluid dynamics, we claim that DMD
gives better results than PCA for dynamic data.
This experiment is, thus, designed to compare
both methods. We note that this comparison is
interesting in its own right because both methods
are data-driven; and in addition, they share similar
matrix decomposition algorithms, but differ only
in the information being exploited. In particular,
DMD is a motion-based method (thus capturing the
dynamics in a video) whereas PCA is a nonmotion-
based method. By comparing these two methods,
we can gauge how much improvement is brought
by the visual dynamics as captured by DMD; and
as a result, how much degradation one might incur
when this information is not exploited.
6) Repeatability of experimental results on another data
set. As a final experiment, we shall also investigate
the performance of the proposed pipeline on a different
dataset i.e., the CASIA-FASD database. Not only is
this database more challenging, it also contains another
variant of the spoof attack produced by a 2D printed face
photo with perforated eyes (cut photo), thus simulating
eye-blinking. Since DMD is completely data-driven,
we conjecture that DMD will capture the eye-blinking
as well as the artefacts due to the printed face. This
would present a challenging task for any facial liveness
detection algorithm.
Finally, we conclude this experimental section by summaris-
ing the results of the overall experiments and by comparing
with the existing state-of-the-art methods.
A. Potential of DMD
Figure 4 shows a valid video, a print attack video and a
reply attack video, each recorded under either controlled or
adverse conditions (in the top row). The middle and bottom
rows show their corresponding first dynamic mode and PCA
mode images. DMD captures the changes, fluctuations in
intensities, and small variations obtained by suppressing the
stable information present within the videos. Hence, in this
case, DMD is able to suppress the background information
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Fig. 4. Examples of the genuine and spoof attacks in controlled and adverse
scenarios. The top row shows original images of valid access, photo and video
attacks (left to right respectively). The middle row shows their corresponding
first DMD mode and the bottom row shows their corresponding first PCA
mode.
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Fig. 5. Eigenvalue plot of DMD for one of the video clips in the replay-
attack dataset. Each dot in the circle is a complex eigenvalue. If there are N
images in the video, there are N − 1 complex eigenvalues.
from the video sequence (which is stationary). DMD not
only captured the movements in the facial expressions like
eye blinks and lip movements but also the facial texture of
the person inside the video frames. For the valid access, the
texture of the person is weaker. On the other hand, we notice
a stronger texture in the dynamic mode when the attack was
carried out by a video.
It should be noted that the dynamic mode for the print attack
displays a corrupted facial image. One reason is that a spoofing
video with a printed photograph may have captured uniform
illumination from the laptop screen with no dynamics inside
the video. Another reason may be that there is no significant
fluctuations within the intensities of this spoof video. As a
result, the first DMD mode does not contain any distinctive
movement.
In the case of controlled scenario the background was
plain, with some shadings and shadows, as shown in the
original videos. However, in the DMD mode, the background
is completely suppressed. In addition, we observe that the
dynamic mode for printed photograph attack contains a cor-
rupted version of the individual’s image with the background
suppressed. These images show the strength of DMD as a
preprocessing technique to distinguish between a valid and
printed photograph attack.
B. Selection of DMD modes
For N number of frames, we obtain N−1 DMD modes. We
calculate the phase angles based on the complex eigenvalues
and select the eigenvector which has the eigenvalue phase
angle = 0 (or the closest value = 0) and compute the dynamic
mode.
mode-1
(0%)
mode-2
(0.2%)
Mode-3
(0.1%)
Mode-4
(0.5%)
Mode-5
(0.9%)
Mode-6
(0.5%)
Fig. 6. DMD modes from 1 to 6 (with HTER in % for test set on replay-
attack dataset shown in brackets) showing the dynamics within the video
frame sequence for valid access (top row), photo (middle row) and video
attacks (bottom row).
Figure 5 shows the eigenvalues of upper Hessenberg matrix
H , which represents the mapping between video frames. Un-
stable eigenvalues are located outside the circle [15] [14] and
stable eigenvalues can be found on the circle [17] [16]. For the
selection of modes, we calculate the phase angle for each of
the eigenvalues, i.e, the eigenvalue at (1, 0) has phase angle =
0 and captures the overall dynamics from the video sequence.
The phase angles above the axis [(−1, 0), (1, 0)] correspond to
positive phase and negative phase angles respectively. Each of
these dynamic modes captures various dynamic information
pertaining to the video sequence, from large scale to small
scale, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6 shows the first 6 DMD modes of the three video
samples of a valid video, photo attack and replay attack.
These DMD modes are ordered in increasing phase angles with
respect to the axis [(−1, 0), (1, 0)]. We observe that modes 4
and 6 of the valid video capture the complex dynamics of eye-
blinking whereas modes 1 and 3 captures the lips movement of
the video attack. For the print attack, DMD simply captures
a non-uniform motion. The captured pattern does not have
vitality signs such as eye-blinking, lips movement or head
movement. The DMD modes for valid ones are observed with
a different texture compared to video attacks. These properties
may be sufficient to distinguish between a valid access and a
spoof attack. We opted for dynamic mode-1 in our experiments
as it gave us the best results by cross validation. This is
supported by the literature [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]
which indicates that the first dynamic mode captures the
largest dynamic scale or principal motion that is present in
the sequence of images. In the next subsection, we assess the
choice of LBP on the classification performance.
C. Impact of LBP parameters on the classification perfor-
mance
1) On the replay-attack dataset: Recall that our implemen-
tation pipeline includes DMD, LBP and SVM (see Figure 3).
In the training phase, the dynamic mode images corresponding
to all the videos within the training set are given as an input
to the LBP algorithm to obtain the LBP histogram features.
The effectiveness of LBP depends on the different parameters
for the block-size B = {1 × 1, 3 × 3, 5 × 5} and radius
R = {1, 2, 3}. These parameters are optimised by minimising
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Fig. 7. Impact of block-size and radius of LBP on the HTER across the
print-attack dataset (left) and replay-attack dataset (right).
HTER on the development set. We report our experiments on
optimisation of these parameters.
On the training set, a HTER of 0% is attained across
B = {1× 1, 3× 3, 5× 5} and radius R = {1, 2, 3} as shown
in Figure 7 (right). For this reason, we opt to concatenate
3− LBPu28,1 and 5− LBPu28,1 features to form a larger feature
vector. This hybrid feature vector can better capture the
spatial arrangement of the texture properties within the video
dynamics. The resultant LBP feature is of a dimensionality
1 − by − 2006 (9×59 + 25×59; here 9 represents the 3×3
blocks, 25 represents the 5×5 blocks and 59 is the number of
bins in the histogram). These concatenated LBP features for
the train set are then fed to an SVM classifier with intersection
kernel to train the classifier. We have not performed any
parameter tuning on the SVM classifier but have selected 1
as the near boundary coefficient. We then proceed in a similar
way to obtain the LBP features for videos in the development
set and test set. The concatenated LBP features from the
development set are fed into the trained SVM classifier to
detect whether the input video is a spoof or not. At this stage,
we use the class density distributions to obtain the threshold
value = −0.1370. Later, this threshold value is used on the
test set to discriminate between valid and spoofed videos.
2) On print-attack dataset: We proceed with a similar
implementation process as in the case of the replay-attack in
Section V-C1. Figure 7 (left), however, shows better results
when compared to Figure 7 (right); in this, we observe an
HTER of zero for 3−LBPu28,1, 3−LBPu28,2, 3−LBPu28,3 on the
training, development and test sets respectively. Hence, it was
sufficient to consider 3 − LBPu28,1 for the print-attack dataset
and no further concatenation of LBP codes was required.
Based on the development set, it is clear that 3−LBPu28,1 is
a better choice for both print and replay-attack datasets. This
turns out to be consistent with Chingovska et al.’s [19] work,
although they worked in the spatial, static-image domain,
whereas our method operates in the spatial, dynamic domain.
D. Performance at the video level
1) On replay-attack dataset: Using the threshold value
= −0.1370 obtained on the development set, we compute
the HTER score on the test set. The HTER scores of the
propositions submitted to the 2nd competition on ”Counter
Measures to 2D Face Spoofing Attacks” [54] competition were
evaluated on the replay-attack dataset. The CASIA and LNMIIT
teams achieved 0% HTER on both the development and the
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Fig. 8. HTER of the top X×10-frames evaluated on the development and
test sets from print-attack dataset (left) and replay-attack dataset (right), here
X ranges from 1, 2 . . . , 240.
test set. Our method showed 0.5% HTER on development set
and 0% on test set.
2) On print-attack dataset: The results for the print-attack
at video level reveal a HTER values of 0%, 0% and 0% on
training, development and test sets respectively. These results
were also achieved by the UOULU and IDIAP teams in the
1st competition on ”Counter Measures to 2D Face Spoofing
Attacks” [24] by using texture analysis methods.
E. Performance of window based approach
Since DMD needs to operate with a sequence of video
frames, it is of interest to find out the minimum number
of frames required. We conjecture that more frames should
result in more stable performance; however, at the same time,
we would like to know the minimum number of frames that
is required to distinguish a valid access from attack videos.
Consequently, we select the windows of the first 10, 20, · · · 240
frames from the training videos and evaluate it on development
and test sets. We can consider at most 240 frames because all
attack videos are truncated to 240 frames.
1) On replay-attack dataset: The first 10, 20, · · · 240 frames
in the video sequence are considered and given as an input
to the DMD algorithm. Therefore, for every training video in
print and replay-attack datasets, we obtain 24 sets of windows,
each of which differ by an increment of 10 frames. We then
use the same LBP parameters as reported in Section V-C, to
train each set using the SVM classifier and record the threshold
value on the development set. The trained SVM is then applied
to the test set to record the classification.
Figure 8 (right) shows HTER values for the first
10, 20, · · · 240 frames in the video sequence of the replay-
attack respectively. We notice that the HTER on the train set
was 0% in all the cases and the HTER on the development and
the test set follows a decreasing trend as the number of frames
in the train set are increased. Hence, this validates our con-
jecture that more frames result in a more stable performance.
Although this is consistent with our expectation, the result also
reveals that significantly more frames are required to detect
replayed video attacks using tablets and mobile devices than
the print attack (to be reported next)
The same experiment is repeated with the print attack and
DMD attains 0% HTER, i.e., perfect classification. with just
the first 10 frames across the training, development and tests as
shown in Figure 8 (left). This result compares favourably with
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TABLE III
RESULTS IN HTER % ON REPLAY AND PRINT-ATTACK DATASETS FOR
DMD+SVM, DMD+LBP+SVM (FACE REGIONS AND ENTIRE VIDEO),
PCA+SVM AND PCA+LBP+SVM (FACE REGIONS AND ENTIRE VIDEO)
FEATURES
Replay Attack Print attack
Pipelines Dev Test Dev Test
DMD+SVM (face region) 8.50 7.50 0.00 0.00
DMD+LBP+SVM (face region) 5.33 3.75 0.00 0.00
PCA+SVM (face region) 20.00 21.50 16.25 15.11
PCA+LBP (face region) 11.67 17.50 9.50 5.11
DMD+LBP+SVM (entire video) 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
PCA+LBP+SVM (entire video) 21.75 20.50 11.50 9.50
Fig. 9. Examples of the valid access and spoof attacks in controlled and
adverse scenario for cropped face regions. The top row shows original images
of valid access, photo and video attacks (left to right respectively). The middle
row shows their corresponding first DMD mode and bottom row shows their
corresponding first PCA mode.
Anjos et al.’s (2011) [18], in which the authors showed that
140 images are required to attain their best recognition per-
formance. The method is based on optical flow. An enhanced
version of their methodology in [35] requires more amount
of images as an input for achieving improved results. This
suggests that DMD pipeline can capture dynamics information
more efficiently than methods based on optical flow features.
F. Experiments on additional research questions
1) Performance on cropped frames: Due to the fact that
spoof attacks in the replay-attack dataset have larger faces in
comparison to the faces of the valid access, it is of interest
to investigate if this might influence the classification results.
Therefore we evaluate our experimental protocol only when
the face regions are considered.
For this reason, we implement Viola-Jones face detection
algorithm [55] to detect the face regions. All of the cropped
images were of size 64×64. Examples of the valid access and
spoof attacks in controlled and adverse scenarios for cropped
face regions is shown in Figure 9. The top row shows original
images of valid access, photo and video attacks (left to right
respectively). The middle row shows their corresponding first
DMD mode and bottom row shows their corresponding first
PCA mode. Similar experimental protocol is followed and
the results are shown in Table III. We see that an HTER of
5.3% was recorded on the development set of the replay-attack
dataset and an HTER of 3.7% was recorded on the test set.
The print attack recorded 0% on both the development and
test sets.
2) DMD features vs LBP features: It is of interest to see
whether LBP could bring any improvements to our proposed
pipeline. Therefore, we investigate this setting by feeding
DMD features directly to the SVM classifier. We do not in-
vestigate this scenario on the full images because the resultant
image dimension will be prohibitively large (The full frame
size is 240× 320 and the resultant feature vector would be a
size of 76800 × V , where V is the total number of videos).
In the case of cropped images the feature vector is of size
4096×V since the frame size is 64×64. The results for DMD
features recorded an HTER of 8.5% and 7.5% on development
and test set respectively as shown in Table III. In the case of
the print attack both development and test set have an HTER =
0. When compared to DMD+LBP features we see an HTER
of 5.3% and 3.7% being recorded on the development and
test sets of the replay-attack dataset. Therefore, we clearly see
that the classification performance is improved using the LBP
feature of the DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline.
3) DMD vs PCA: In order to further indicate the potential
significance of the DMD method we compare our results
with the PCA algorithm as a baseline method. The results
for PCA features give an HTER of 20% and 21.5% on the
development and test sets of the replay-attack dataset respec-
tively as shown in Table III. PCA+LBP features recorded
an HTER of 11.6% and 17.5% on development and test set
respectively. In the case of the print attack, both development
and test sets have an HTER of 16.2% and 15.1% for PCA
features while PCA+LBP recorded an HTER of 9.5% and
5.1% on development and test sets. Comparing to the results
of DMD+SVM and DMD+LBP+SVM (entire video & face
regions), PCA+SVM and PCA+LBP+SVM (entire video &
face regions) show lower classification performance.
G. Proposed pipeline on CASIA-FASD Dataset
We have only considered the face regions for this dataset
as the background of videos for different types of attacks are
different, and this could possibly influence the classification
performance. Examples of the valid and spoof attacks in
CASIA-FASD (High Resolution HR) are shown in Figure 10.
The top row shows original images of valid access, photo,
cut photo and video attacks (left to right respectively). The
middle row shows their corresponding first DMD mode and the
bottom row shows their corresponding first PCA mode. The
first DMD mode for the cut photo attack clearly shows high
intensity values in the eye region as the eyes were continuously
blinking for this type of attack.
Similar experimental protocols have been followed as above
and the results are listed in Table IV. Once again, we observe
that the DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline attains the best perfor-
mance, although the error rates are considerably higher than
those reported on the print and replay attack datasets.
H. Overall summary
In this study, we have demonstrated the potential of DMD
as a preprocessing technique in highlighting the lip move-
ments, facial textures and eye blinks across an entire video
sequence. We have studied the effects of LBP parameters
on the classification performance. Concatenation of the LBP
codes 3 − LBPu28,1, 5 − LBPu28,1 to obtain an LBP code of
IEEE TRANS. ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 14
Fig. 10. Examples of the valid and spoof attacks in CASIA-FASD (High
Resolution HR). The top row shows original images of valid access, photo, cut
photo and video attacks (left to right respectively). The middle row shows their
corresponding first DMD mode and bottom row shows their corresponding
first PCA mode.
TABLE IV
CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF HTER (%) ON THE ON
CASIA-FASD DATASET FOR DMD+SVM, DMD+LBP+SVM,
PCA+SVM AND PCA+LBP+SVM
On face region Test
DMD+SVM 29.50
DMD+LBP+SVM 21.75
PCA+SVM 33.50
PCA+LBP+SVM 24.50
dimensionality 1 − by − 2006 performed well on the replay-
attack dataset. For the print-attack dataset there is no need
to concatenate LBP codes, since the codes corresponding to
3−LBPu28,1, 3−LBPu28,2 and 3−LBPu28,3 demonstrated an HTER
of 0% across training, development and test sets respectively.
We have also conducted experiments at both the video level
and frame level. At the video level, the proposed methodology
achieves perfect recognition performance at HTER of 0%
on the print attack data set; whereas for the replay attack,
0.5% and 0% is recorded on the development and test sets,
respectively. These results show a good separability between
the spoof and non-spoof samples for the considered datasets.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF HTER (%) ON TEST SETS FOR THE PROPOSED PIPELINE
WITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART. HERE, E: ON ENTIRE VIDEO AND
F: ON FACE REGIONS.
Algorithm Print
attack
Replay
attack
CASIA-
FASD
Anjos et al.
(2013) [35]
Optical flow correla-
tion
1.52 - -
Schwartz et al.
(2011) [31]
Partial least squares - - -
Pereira et al.
(2013) [56]
Motion correlation
LBP
LBP-TOP
-
-
-
-
11.79
15.45
8.51
30.33
23.19
23.75
Chingovska et al.
(2012) [19]
LBP+LDA
LBP+SVM
-
-
13.87
18.17
Proposed method DMD+LBP+SVME
DMD+LBP+SVMF
DMD+SVMF
PCA+SVMF
PCA+LBP+SVMF
PCA+LBP+SVME
0.00
0.00
0.00
15.11
5.11
9.50
0.00
3.75
7.50
21.50
17.11
20.50
-
21.75
29.50
33.50
24.50
-
Since DMD needs to operate with a sequence of frames in a
video, it is desirable to find out the minimum number of frames
required. For this purpose, we have repeated the experiments
with progressively increasing frame sizes of 10, 20, · · · 240.
Consistent with our conjecture, more frames result in more
stable performance. For the print-attack dataset, our algorithm
produces 0% HTER across all the datasets. This implies
that the artefacts produced by the print attack videos do not
contain any long-term dynamics; and that the attack can be
detected by DMD effectively. In addition, we have addressed
related research issues such as: i) evaluating the experimental
protocol on face regions instead of evaluating on the entire
video ii) comparing DMD with a baseline method i.e PCA,
iii) addressing the importance of LBP in the methodolog-
ical pipeline and finally evaluating the performance on a
different dataset with diversified attacks. The experimental
results show that: i) DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline on the face
regions degrades slightly in performance when compared to
the analysis on entire videos by HTER 3% − 6%. ii) DMD
based pipelines such as DMD+SVM and DMD+LBP+SVM
work better than the PCA based pipelines, thus demonstrating
the significance of motion based methods in distinguishing
between valid accesses and spoof attacks compared to non-
motion based methods such as PCA. Our experiments on
CASIA-FASD dataset also show the strength of the proposed
DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline. Our experimental results, follow-
ing strictly the published experimental protocols, show that
the proposed DMD pipeline achieved the best performance
reported so far with an exception of komulainen et al.’s
method [38]. The authors proposed to use context information
such as facial, upper body and background information. In
our case, we just used the facial features because our primary
objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of DMD for distin-
guishing valid videos from the spoofed ones given only facial
information. Komulainen et al.’s experiment informs us that
using contextual information is extremely important. Indeed,
when DMD is given the entire video frame instead of the face
region only, the DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline also attains zero
HTER (see Table V, proposed methods). This experimental
setting is particularly interesting because the faces in the
replayed videos have slightly larger size than those of the
valid videos. This was designed to be so in order to avoid
the frames of the replay device (tablet or mobile phone) from
being captured and subsequently exploited by the algorithm
designer. Nevertheless, DMD inadvertently captures the subtle
cue in facial size difference, leading to perfect recognition on
the test set. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect improved
performance with DMD given more contextual information
such as the upper body part as in komulainen et al.work.
Our advantage, in our case is that the same DMD+LBP+SVM
pipeline can be used straightforwardly without modification.
Finally, to conclude this summary section, we compare the
experimental results obtained so far using variants of DMD
with various methods reported in the literature. The results
as indicated in Table V demonstrate that DMD compares
favourably, and even exceeds, current state-of-the-art methods.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This study shows the significance of the DMD method as a
preprocessing technique when coupled with LBP and SVM to
effectively detect spoof samples. We applied the DMD method
to 1200 video clips of photo and video attacks on 50 clients,
under different lighting conditions acquired from the replay-
attack dataset; 400 video clips of photo attacks from the print-
attack dataset; and 600 video clips from the CASIA-FASD
dataset. The results are exceedingly promising in tackling the
photo, cut photo and video attack challenges.
A. Conclusions
DMD can extract temporal dynamics efficiently in a data-
driven manner and the resultant ”texture dynamics” can
be efficiently represented by LBP features with appropriate
parametrisation. In the tested scenarios, 3 − LBPu28,1 appears
to be suitable across the various print and replay attacks that
we have tested on. This parameter is likely to be dependent
on image resolution and camera quality. The SVM histogram
intersection kernel works particularly well with the histogram
features derived from LBP, with the additional convenience of
no additional parameter tuning being required. The pipeline
as a whole is thus efficient and easy to use, DMD and SVM
in combination with the histogram intersection kernel hence
requiring no tuning. Compared to other approaches reported to
date, DMD appears to give superior performance. We attribute
this to (1) the capacity of DMD to extract the dynamics
of video sequence, as well as (2) the choice of pipeline
within which DMD is deployed. Since DMD can capture
video dynamics such as blinking eyes or mouth movements,
or other non-obvious and subtle cues, this spares us from
computing features that explicitly identify these cues. This
is the main difference between our approach and cue-based
methods. Although our work also makes use of LBP, it is
used to represent the texture dynamics as opposed to static
textures such as in the approach of Chingovska et al.’s [19].
We also note that a number of other methods have attempted to
directly exploit dynamics such as those reported by Chakka et
al. [24]. However, the performance reported in our work arises
mainly from the capability of DMD to extract the dynamics
of video automatically, and from the unique combination of
DMD+LBP+SVM in a classification pipeline.
B. Future directions
Our locus of future research will aim to improve the
DMD+LBP+SVM pipeline in the following ways:
• Concatenation of all the dynamic modes. As the DMD
algorithm generates N − 1 dynamic modes (where N
is the number of frames in the video), it is of interest
to concatenate some or all of these dynamic modes
to represent a single image and produce corresponding
LBP codes in order to further improve the classification
performance, especially for very difficult video attacks.
• Application of LBP on each dynamic mode. LBP codes
could be produced on each of the N − 1 dynamic modes
individually. It is possible to compute a mean LBP code
from these modes in order to further improve the overall
classifier performance.
• Multiple kernel learning approach. A linear com-
bination of Mercer kernels is also a Mercer kernel.
Consequently, a Histogram Intersection kernel could be
computed for each of the dynamic modes individually
and a linear combination of these kernels could then be
considered for classification.
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